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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional theory has long held that the separation of powers is unique to presidential 
systems and incompatible with parliamentary ones. This conventional wisdom has hardened over 
the years with the proliferation of scholarship debating the merits of presidential or 
parliamentary systems for emerging democracies or reconstructed states.
1
 Yet what remains 
unexplored within this conventional wisdom in constitutional design is whether the democratic 
virtues of the separation of powers are achievable in both presidential and parliamentary systems. 
The answer, I believe, is yes.  
                                                 
† Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D., B.A.); Oxford University (B.C.L.); 
Harvard University (LL.M.). For illuminating discussions on separation of powers theory and for helpful comments 
on previous drafts, I am delighted to thank Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Gabriel Hindin, Allan Hutchinson, Rajeev 
Kadambi, Donald Kommers, Daryl Levinson, Leah Roffman, Danielle Sievers, and Mark Tushnet. I am also pleased 
to acknowledge La Fondation Baxter & Alma Ricard for its generous support. 
1 See, e.g., JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2007); THE FAILURE 
OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (JUAN J. LINZ & ARTURO VALENZUELA eds., 1994); GIOVANNI SARTORI, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES 
(1994); PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT (AREND LIJPHARD ed., 1992); ANIRUDH PRADSAD, 
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT OR PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (1981); Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell, The 
Institutional Foundation of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems, 
150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 171 (1994); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary 
Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 WM AND MARY L. REV. 679 (1993). 
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For despite its prevalence in the community of nations, the presidential separation of 
powers is neither constitutive nor descriptive of modern constitutionalism. Indeed, many 
constitutional democracies contravene the underlying philosophy of separated governmental 
powers insofar as they exhibit the very opposite of the separation of powers: the fusion of 
governmental powers.
2
 These regimes tend predominantly to be parliamentary systems, whose 
two defining traits are, first, the reliance of the head of government upon the legislature for its 
political survival and, second, the executive power to trigger elections by dissolving the 
legislature.
3
 Such powers are generally unavailable to the executive in presidential systems 
precisely because presidential systems typically adhere to the separation of powers.
4
  
 
The division of labor contemplated by separation of powers theory cannot tolerate fused 
powers because separating powers endeavors to endow one governmental branch with an 
intrusive power of oversight over another, all within an interlocking web of mutual distrust. The 
consequence of organizing government power in this way—so as to cultivate an invasive overlap 
among government departments—is to prevent any single organ of the state from achieving 
absolute power. This is a terribly important objective for any democratic state. Yet it is but one 
of the core values served by the separation of powers. Other values include preventing arbitrary 
government, defending against legislative supremacy, and promoting governmental efficiency.  
 
Democratic presidential systems aspire to these core democratic values, and they deploy 
the separation of powers to achieve them. But does it follow that these core values served by the 
separation of powers cannot be achieved in parliamentary systems? That is the question that will 
occupy many of the pages to follow. Yet before we can answer this question, we must first pose 
at least three subsidiary questions: (1) What do we mean by the values of the separation of 
powers?; (2) What are those values?; and (3) Is there more than one kind of parliamentary 
system? Only once we explore these questions may we then answer whether the values of the 
separation of powers may be achieved in parliamentary systems. 
 
I will demonstrate that the values of the separation of powers are indeed achievable, at 
least in part, in parliamentary systems. This conclusion—that parliamentary and presidential 
systems are comparably receptive to the practical and philosophical strictures of separated 
powers—carries with it profound implications for the future of separated powers and unlocks 
several possibilities for rethinking constitutional structure afresh. 
 
In Part II of this paper, I will assess the conventional wisdom that separated powers are 
integral to democracy. I will also explore the values served by separating governmental powers. 
Part III will illustrate and distinguish the several existing forms of parliamentary systems, and 
will moreover probe in a systematic fashion whether the values of separated powers may be 
achieved in each type of parliamentary system. I will answer this important question in the 
affirmative, in so doing freeing us from the rigid belief that the separation of powers is a 
                                                 
2 See, e.g. CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRALIA (1900); CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (British North America Act 1867); 
GERMAN BASIC LAW (1949); CONSTITUTION OF SPAIN (1978); ISRAEL BASIC LAW (1992); CONSTITUTION OF NEW 
ZEALAND (Constitution Act 1986). 
3 Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism 
Versus Presidentialism, 46 WORLD POL. 1, 3 (1993). 
4 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The United States Presidentialism in the Civil 
Law Melting Pot, 21 B.U. INT`L L.J. 29, 34-39 (2003). 
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necessary feature of democratic systems. Part IV will draw upon these conclusions to suggest 
new ways to approach the separation of powers. Part V will conclude with suggestions for 
further inquiry.  
II. DEMOCRACY AND SEPARATED POWERS
 Perhaps the most critical observation for our purposes is that constitutional scholarship 
regards democracy and the separation of powers as virtually synonymous, the latter deemed 
indispensable to the former. Granted, this is largely an American phenomenon, an unsurprising 
one given that the United States Constitution separates its powers. But this conventional 
narrative holding that democracy demands the separation of powers extends also to 
scholarship by American and non-American authors about non-American and non-presidentialist 
constitutional traditions.
5
 And that is surprising.  
 
It is equally interesting that the global popular culture also itself conceives of separated 
powers as fundamental to democracy.
6
 I raise this point not to understate the salutary 
consequences of separating powers in constitutional systems but rather only to note that there 
appears to be a strong presumption that presidential systems achieve certain standards of 
governance that rival systems do not. All of which begs the question: why are separated powers 
thought to be indispensable to democracy? 
A. Separation Theory 
 
The separation of powers is a common feature of modern constitutionalism.
7
 The concept 
of separating powers derives from political and philosophical inquiry,
8
 Biblical and Near Eastern 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Venezuela, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 439, 464 (2007); Aharon Barak, 
Human Rights in Israel, 39 ISR. L. REV. 12, 20 (2006); Reynaud N. Daniels & Jason Brickhill, The Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty and the South African Constitutional Court, 25 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 371, 378 (2006); 
Okezie Chukwumerije, Peer Review and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 49, 89 (2006); Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. 
& POL’Y J. 180, 239 n.214 (2003) (quoting Deng Xiaoping); Patrick Heller, Degrees of Democracy: Some 
Comparative Lessons from India, 52 WORLD POL. 484, 492 (2000); Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking 
Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 
415, 421 (2000); Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 529 (1999). 
6 See, e.g., Naomi Buck, A Strategic Partnership for Germany and Russia, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Germany), October 15, 
2007, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,511515,00.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009); 
Tony Wright, Parties in Step as they March Over the Judicial System, THE AGE (Melbourne, Australia), July 17, 
2007, at 2; Masha Lipman, Putin’s Sovereign Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, July 15, 2006, at A21; Brigid Laffan, 
Does the Commission Need to be Reined in by the Member-States?, THE IRISH TIMES, March 20, 2003; Konstantin 
Zuyev, Dangerous Democracy, MOSCOW TIMES, March 1, 1996; Petra Alince, Slovaks Should Build a Civil Society, 
PRAGUE POST (Czech Republic), March 2, 1994. 
7 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF ARGENTINA §§ 44, 86, 87, 108 (1994); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, 
Chapters VIII, X, XI (1992); CONSTITUTION OF MEXICO, art. 49 (1917); CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA, Chapters V-VII 
(1992); CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA, art. 1 (1991); CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE, art. 6 (1996). 
8 Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in 
Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 456-74 (1991); Gerhard Casper, The American Constitutional 
Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers, 30 WM AND MARY L. REV. 211, 213 (1989). 
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sources,
9
 ancient Greek and Roman models of mixed government,
10
 and American political 
theory and advocacy.
11
 Its animating purpose is to divide governmental functions in the service 
of certain values of public administration and governance.  
 
Governmental powers may be separated along three axes: (1) horizontal; (2) vertical; and 
(3) diagonal. Horizontal separation which is the focus of this Article refers to the division of 
powers among government branches that are part of the same order of government. The leading 
illustration of horizontally separated powers is the tripartite division of federal powers in the 
United States Constitution.
12
 In contrast, vertical separation refers to the division of powers 
between two or more orders of government. A useful example is the Canadian federal 
Constitution, which expressly distinguishes between national and sub-national governmental 
functions.
13
 Governmental powers may also be separated diagonally consistent with the principle 
of subsidiarity.
14
 Subsidiarity requires that a given governmental objective be pursued by the 
lowest level of government—the one closest to the people—capable of successfully achieving 
it.
15
 It is perhaps most discernible in the European Convention.
16
 
 
 The original theory of horizontally separated powers divided powers between the 
executive and legislative branches.
17
 But the modern theory of horizontally separated powers 
generally divides powers among three branches of government and holds that the legislature 
should create laws, the executive should enforce those laws, and the judiciary should interpret 
them. This separation rests in large measure upon the perceived comparative advantages of each 
branch of government, for instance the ability of the judiciary to apply rules of general 
application to specific cases, or the capacity of the executive to move swiftly to respond to public 
needs, or the competence of the legislature in balancing diverse and often contrary interests.
18
  
 
Separated powers reflect the philosophy that governmental functions should be 
distributed among the organs of the state. This theory relies on three reasonable premises: (1) the 
government should discharge all law-related functions; (2) those functions can be divided into 
three coherent categories; and (3) this tripartite division is a rational way to structure the state. 
But it is not always clear which governmental functions should be assigned to which particular 
branch of government.
19
 Moreover, it is not clear that horizontally separated powers necessarily 
demand three government departments. Indeed, one could create a governmental structure 
                                                 
9 Bernard M. Levinson, The First Constitution: Rethinking the Origins of Rule of Law and Separation of Powers in 
Light of Deuteronomy, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1853, 1858 (2006). 
10 M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 23-57 (2d ed. 1998). 
11 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 37-51 (JACOB E. COOKE ed., 1961). 
12 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, arts. 1, 2, 3. 
13 CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (British North America Act 1867) §§ 91, 92. 
14 For more on subsidiarity, see Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 
35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001); Nicholas W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity, 11 EUR. L.J. 308 (2005). 
15 George A. Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European Union, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 97 (1993). 
16 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, C 325 (2002) Art. 5. 
17 HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 182 
(1989). 
18 THOMAS CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 19-26 (2004). 
19 William B. Gwyn, The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers: The Indeterminacy of 
the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 20 WM AND MARY L. REV. 263, 267 (1989). 
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composed of four,
20
 five,
21
 or even more
22
 departments—an arrangement that would nonetheless 
satisfy the strictures of horizontal separation.  
B. The Values of Separated Powers 
 
In his influential article on separating powers, Barendt argues that the separation of 
powers can serve at least four democratic values: (1) guarding against government tyranny; (2) 
defending against legislative supremacy; (3) preventing arbitrary government; and (4) promoting 
governmental efficiency.
23
 This is a helpful point of departure for assessing the values of 
separated powers because constitutional scholars generally argue that the separation of powers 
advances one or more of these values. In this Part, I will sketch and probe the meaning of each of 
these four democratic values. 
1. Guarding Against Government Tyranny 
 
A state that governs through tyranny cannot claim democratic legitimacy. For 
Montesquieu, who defined tyranny as an unconstrained coercive authority that retains the power 
to limit popular choice,
24
 tyrannical rule defies the very essence of democracy, which folds into 
itself the notion of liberty.
25
 In turn, liberty, to Montesquieu, demands the capacity to govern 
one’s self, in the sense of having a free soul, and to govern one’s state through representative 
democracy.
26
 These two elements of liberty form the nucleus of Montesquieu’s defense of the 
separation of powers as a structural tool that frustrates the tyrannical ambitions of rulers.  
 
Separating powers was Montesquieu’s answer to tyranny. In order to achieve liberty, 
thought Montesquieu, and to achieve the “tranquility of spirit” that comes from the comfort and 
security of choice, the three governmental powers—legislative, executive and judicial—should 
reside in different stations.
27
 Unless the legislative power is constituted by means of 
representative democracy and unless this power is separated from others, then tyranny is likely to 
result: “When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single 
body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate 
that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically.”
28
 Montesquieu therefore deployed 
                                                 
20 See, e.g. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Pt. V, ch. I, art. 53 (1950) (vesting executive power in the President); Pt. V, ch. 
II, art. 79 (establishing a Parliament); Pt. V, ch. IV, art. 124 (establishing a Supreme Court); Pt. V, ch. V, art. 148 
(establishing the office of Comptroller and Auditor-General). The Constitution authorizes the President to exercise 
limited legislative powers in exceptional circumstances. See Pt. V, ch. III, art. 123. 
21 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA, Title VIII, Ch. III, arts. 99-104 (1949) (establishing the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal); Title IX (establishing the legislative branch); Title X (establishing the executive branch); Title 
XI (establishing the judicial branch); Title XIII, Ch. II, arts. 183-84 (establishing Office of the Comptroller General). 
22 See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 7 (1945) (establishing the six principal organs of the United 
Nations). 
23 Eric Barendt, Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government, 1995 PUBLIC LAW 599, 601-05. 
24 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, BOOK 11, CHAPTER 6, 157-59 (ANNE M. 
COHLER ET AL. eds. 1989). 
25 Id. at 157. 
26 Id. at 159. 
27 Id. at 157. 
28 Id. at 157. 
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the separation of powers as a constitutional structure to foreclose the law-making, law-enforcing 
and law-interpreting functions from resting in a single seat. 
 
Preventing the concentration of power is regarded today as the principal purpose of 
separating powers.
29
 It should therefore come as no surprise that that fundamental preoccupation 
of modern statecraft is to diffuse governmental authority across public institutions.
30
 And this has 
been the case ever since the American framers made the separation of powers the keystone of 
their constitutional architecture,
31
 reflecting in large measure the Madison vision of 
government.
32
  
2. Defending Against Legislative Supremacy 
 
The separation of powers also serves a second democratic value: defending against 
legislative supremacy. The menace of legislative tyranny is somewhat veiled because democratic 
rule through the legislature carries a certain popular appeal.
33
 Although legislative supremacy 
may be consistent with a crude understanding of procedural democracy, it may in fact conflict 
with the ideals of substantive democracy. The majoritarianism that characterizes legislative 
supremacy threatens to trample on fundamental rights when politically expedient or when times 
of crisis appear to suggest no other alternative. As Gardbaum writes, legislative supremacy raises 
the problem of legally unlimited majoritarianism, which suffers no limits on legislative authority, 
be those limits statutory, conventional, cultural, moral or derived from the common law.
34
 The 
appeal of majority rule as a mechanism for mediating preferences is indisputable but its appeal 
evaporates against the backdrop of pluralist liberal democracy.
35
 
 
This is precisely what convinced the American framers to separate powers as the 
structural basis for their new confederation. As Madison wrote, citizens should be weary of the 
legislative ambition to expand its sphere of influence
36
 and the legislative predisposition toward 
self-aggrandizement,
37
 something that can be neither controlled nor tamed absent robust 
institutional arrangements that moderate legislative power.
38
 Early American citizens themselves 
also came to believe that it would be necessary to check the threat of legislative overreaching,
39
 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and the Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 451 (1996); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1802-03 
(1996); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1534 (1991); Larry 
Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette, 65 IND. L.J. 283, 286 (1990). 
30 Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role 
of Political Parties, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 12-13 (2007). 
31 ANNE M. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU’S COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
167 (1988). 
32 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (JACOB E. COOKE ed., 1961). 
33 MICHAEL FOLEY, THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 14 (1999). 
34 Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 739 (2001). 
35 Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1284 n.4 (1984). 
36 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (JACOB E. COOKE ed., 1961). 
37 THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 341 (James Madison) (JACOB E. COOKE ed., 1961). 
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Alexander Hamilton) (JACOB E. COOKE ed., 1961). 
39 Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 65-67 (2003). 
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and consequently conferred upon themselves and their governmental agents several institutional 
tools to do just that, including a bill of rights and the power of judicial review.
40
 
 
The separation of powers may help foil not only the rise of legislative supremacy but also 
of judicial
41
 and executive supremacy.
42
 For it is not only legislative supremacy that citizens 
should fear. Equally worrisome concerns about the integrity of democratic processes would flow 
from judicial supremacy
43
 and executive supremacy.
44
 The separation of powers therefore helps 
to control the risk of all three supremacies, which is similar to the work that the separation of 
powers achieves in frustrating the concentration of power discussed above. Going forward, I will 
therefore group the concentration of power and defending against legislative supremacy under 
the same heading. 
3. Preventing Arbitrary Government 
 
This third democratic value of separated powers is perhaps the least appreciated yet the 
most important: preventing arbitrary government. American commentators have noted that the 
separation of powers was developed with this very purpose in mind.
45
 Indeed, the framers 
rejected a proposal to include a bill of rights in the original Constitution precisely because they 
thought that separated powers were sufficient to protect against the exercise of arbitrary power.
46
  
 
The significance of this third democratic value derives from the fundamental democratic 
principle of the rule of law, whose two commonly understood features are predictability in the 
exercise of official power and fairness in the administration of the law.
47
 The separation of 
powers helps achieve these objectives because its design complicates the arbitrary exercise of 
power. Endowing each branch with its own powers serves as a form of notice-giving. It fosters 
predictability in the discharge of governmental responsibilities and facilitates popular 
accountability in the exercise of public duties. As Bellamy explains, the separation of powers 
                                                 
40 Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IOWA L. REV. 401, 482 (1986). 
41 Carl Lebeck, Book Review, Accountability in Supra- and International Organizations: Between Judicialization 
and Post-National Political Constitutionalism?, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 93 (2005). 
42 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law is, 83 GEO. L.J. 
217, 300-03 (1994). 
43 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
44 See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on 
Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 137 (1993); Harold Honju Koh, 
Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 
(1988). 
45 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF 
SEPARATION 14-26 (1996); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY 4 (1990); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 646 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1441-51 (1987). 
46 Ron Merkel, Separation of Powers—A Bulwark for Liberty and a Rights Culture, 69 SASK. L. REV. 129, 129-30 
(2006). 
47 Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 19 (J.M. MARAVALL & A. 
PRZEWORSKI eds. 2003). 
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replaces arbitrary government with a more stable state that administers an impartial legal system 
constituted of prospective laws.
48
  
 
Separated powers therefore establish boundaries between and among the organs of the 
state. Although those organs enjoy a certain margin of discretion in exercising their powers, that 
discretion is itself bounded by the rule of law.
49
 In this way, the separation of powers is thought 
to prevent arbitrary government and in turn compel the branches of government to adopt a 
rational, non-arbitrary, and public-regarding approach to governance.
50
 One practical illustration 
of this relationship is the principle of non-delegation, which springs from separation of powers 
theory and holds that one branch of government may not delegate its powers to another. What 
drives the concept of non-delegation is not exclusively the imperative to prevent tyranny or the 
concentration of power but equally the desire to equip the electorate with the tools to hold each 
branch accountable for its action or inaction.
51
  
4. Promoting Government Efficiency 
 
Separated powers are also said to improve governmental efficiency. The theory here is 
that the division of labor across governmental departments frees one department of government 
to conduct its affairs without undue interference from another one. Posner elaborates the theory 
in greater detail, theorizing that separating powers serves the interest of governmental efficiency 
by assigning certain public functions to the branches that are best suited to achieve the stated 
objective of those functions.
52
 It is simply a matter of institutional competence.
53
  
 
Perhaps the paradigmatic demonstration of separating powers as a way to achieve 
governmental efficiency value may be drawn from a seminal United States Supreme Court 
decision. The Court ruled that requiring the Senate to ratify the President’s decision to dismiss 
United States postmasters would undermine executive efficiency.
54
 The President, wrote the 
Court, ought to retain the authority to make executive choices without the threat of politically-
inspired delaying tactics that risk disrupting the delivery of public serves administrated by the 
executive. 
 
Only a few scholars argue that efficiency is the principal purpose of separated powers.
55
 
Most cite it in tandem with the prevention of tyranny.
56
 Others argue the contrary: that separated 
                                                 
48 Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative 
Democracy, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 436, 438 (1996). 
49 Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1075, 1143 (2003). 
50 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 499-500 (2003). 
51 Gregory M. Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141, 152 (2001). 
52 Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 12 (1987). 
53 See Bradley A. Benedict, Note, Upsetting the Balance: Ignoring the Separation of Powers Doctrine in Council of 
New York v. Bloomberg, 72 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1261, 1266-67 (2007); Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign 
Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 661 (1982). 
54 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
55 See, e.g., Nicholas W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 59 (2001). 
56 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 388 (3d ed. 1996); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design 
and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1185 
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powers are inefficient because they erect barriers to the legislative process.
57
 Yet this 
inefficiency is precisely what helps to prevent the concentration of power. Separated powers, for 
instance, mitigate against the dangers of unilateralism by deliberately placing obstructions 
throughout the legislative process.
58
 Recognizing the causal connection between creating 
inefficiency and thwarting tyranny,
59
 the founders were content to sacrifice optimal efficiency 
for a greater likelihood of liberty.
60
 
C. The Appeal of Separated Powers 
 
There is unsurprisingly no agreement on the main purpose of separating governmental 
powers. Though some argue that we must identify one overriding purpose of separated powers 
over all others,
61
 I am not convinced. The separation of powers serves several valuable purposes 
in a liberal democracy. Yet constitutional theory presupposes that those purposes may be 
achieved only by separating governmental powers. On this score, conventional constitutional 
theory is mistaken. 
 
For example, the political process itself holds promise for achieving important objectives 
that may otherwise be achieved through the separation of powers. In a recent article that has 
recast the very foundations of separation of powers theory, Levinson and Pildes argue that the 
spotlight of separate powers should not shine only on government branches but equally on 
political parties because political competition is as valuable in the effort to defend against the 
concentration of power as is the separation of powers.
62
 Levinson and Pildes advise democracies 
to ensure that the necessary conditions exist to enable political parties to effectively discharge 
their respective roles as government and opposition. 
 
 Specifically, Levinson and Pildes recommend a number of institutional designs that 
might help not only to cultivate and sustain political competition but also to thwart the 
concentration of powers—without compromising government efficiency. These suggestions 
include the following: (1) a strong menu of opposition party rights, for instance opposition days 
and question periods, a role in agenda-setting, and standing committee chair positions; (2) an 
independent administrative or bureaucratic branch of government whose autonomy would 
prevents its capture by either government or opposition parties; and among others (3) electoral 
districts drawn in a non-partisan fashion a non-partisan body.
63
 Such institutional designs could 
conceivably foster a political setting in which the values of the separation of powers are achieved 
in governmental systems where one party has gained control of all organs of the state, for 
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59 John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1403-04 (1997). 
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instance by winning the presidency, holding a majority in both houses of a bicameral legislature, 
and appointing a majority of the judges on the high court—precisely the scenario that gave rise 
to the Levinson-Pildes thesis. 
 
 Ackerman is right to encourage constitutional theorists to consult the research of 
Levinson and Pildes because it should indeed be a reference point for future thought on 
separation of powers theory.
64
 Their important article is useful for at least three reasons. First, it 
has a distinguished lineage insofar as it applies the influential theory of English political theorist 
William Jennings to the American context of presidentialism.
65
 Like Jennings, Levinson and 
Pildes stress the superceding significance of political parties in waging the battle against 
tyranny.
66
 Under both theories, constitutional or structural safeguards against tyranny are good 
but not sufficient. Both recognize the fundamental merit of political safeguards to prevent 
tyranny. In this case, both theories advocate empowering political parties to discharge a checking 
function similar to the institutional function that the constitution would otherwise require one 
branch of government to exercise against another. 
 
Second, although political scientists have long theorized that political parties could 
remedy some of the deficiencies of the separation of powers practice in the United States,
67
 
Levinson and Pildes now make the argument from the perspective of constitutional theory, a 
much different lens through which to assess the political dynamics of institutional power. In 
doing so, Levinson and Pildes have produced a much overdue update to the American project of 
democracy. Their piece not only marks a fundamental renewal of American constitutional theory 
but moreover brings American constitutional theory into conformity with modern American 
constitutional practice. 
 
 The third reason why the work of Levinson and Pildes should be required reading for 
separation of powers theorists concerns a faintly explored question of constitutional theory: the 
relationship between structure and culture. Whether or not they mean to do so, Levinson and 
Pildes have elevated separation of powers theory from a question of constitutional structure to 
one of political culture. Structure of course remains a defining feature of separated powers in 
Levinson and Pildes’ rendering of separation of powers theory, but they implicitly invite readers 
to redirect their focus and approach the separation of powers toward the political landscape. 
Whether constitutional structure follows from political culture or whether political culture 
instead follows from constitutional structure is a useful inquiry because it may help to illuminate 
another path of inquiry in the continuing conversation among political scientists and legal 
theorists about the relative virtues of parliamentary and presidential systems. In these respects, 
Levinson and Pildes help advance the study of the separation of powers. 
 
Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom underpinning the theory of the separation of 
powers continues to hold that separated powers serves three interrelated purposes. First, 
separating powers prevents the arbitrary exercise of governmental power. Second, the 
distribution and allocation of governmental powers is a useful means toward the end of 
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preventing the governmental tyranny that may arise from the concentration of official power. 
This includes defending against legislative, executive and judicial supremacy. And third, 
separating powers is also an effective way to improve government efficiency in administering 
and managing the state. 
III. SEPARATING POWERS IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
Having charted the values served by the separation of powers, I now turn to 
parliamentary systems. This is an important step in answering the question posed above—Is it 
possible to achieve the values of the separation of powers in a parliamentary system?—because 
there exist several forms of parliamentary systems, each of which may be receptive to different 
degrees to the values of separated powers. Though one scholar suggests many secondary forms 
of parliamentary systems,
68
 let us posit that there exist three primary forms of parliamentary 
systems: (1) British parliamentarism; (2) constrained parliamentarism; and (3) semi-
presidentalism. The structural differences among these systems have substantial consequences 
for the promise of achieving the values of separated powers.  
 
In this Part, I will survey these three forms of parliamentarism and assess whether it is 
possible to successfully achieve the democratic values advanced by the separation of powers—
guarding against government tyranny, preventing arbitrary government and promoting 
government efficiency—within each of them. If my analysis reveals that parliamentary systems 
can indeed achieve the values served by the separation of powers, then we can conclude that the 
conventional wisdom which holds that separated powers is an indispensable feature of 
democracy is misguided. My analysis will in fact demonstrate just that. 
A. Unconventional Separation of Powers: British Parliamentarism 
 
 There are three major distinctions between presidential and parliamentary systems. In 
parliamentary systems the government is selected by Parliament, whose members are directly 
elected by the citizenry, the government is vulnerable to no confidence votes, and executive 
power is vested in the Cabinet. In contrast, in presidential systems, the executive and legislative 
branches are selected in separate elections by citizens, the government is not subject to 
parliamentary votes of no confidence and the executive power is vested in one individual.
69
 Two 
further differences are that, first, presidential systems typically establish fixed terms for the head 
of government whereas parliamentary systems require the head of government to retain the 
confidence of a legislative majority and, second, presidential systems forbid the president from 
sitting in the legislature.
70
 (But in the United States, the vice president a member of the 
executive branch is the president of the Senate, one of the two houses of Congress.
71
) 
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British parliamentarism does not separate powers in the conventional sense. Instead it 
fuses powers between the various branches of government.
72
 Perhaps the most illustrative 
example is the office of the Lord Chancellor, an office that until only recently occupied functions 
that were not only executive and legislative in nature but also judicial: the Lord Chancellor was, 
at once, a senior judge and head of the judiciary, a member of the legislature and speaker of the 
House of Lords, and a senior Cabinet minister in the executive branch.
73
 Although the Lord 
Chancellor no longer exists in that unconventional structure, it remains to be seen just how 
closely the new British model of constitutionalism will approximate American presidentialism.
74
 
While the long term may augur a deep structural transformation in the United Kingdom, it is 
unlikely that the state will manifest the results of those transformative changes in the near term. 
 
A more familiar example of fused powers in the British model is the common blending of 
executive and legislative powers. The two branches are a singular approximation, according to 
Bagehot’s well known description.
75
 The head of government is usually drawn from the pool of 
legislative members, as are Cabinet members, all of whom usually concurrently sit in either the 
lower or upper house of Parliament.
76
 As a consequence, the executive, if it commands a 
majority, determines the legislative priorities, usually initiates the legislative process,
77
 and may 
pass any Act of Parliament in the legislature, often with nominal opposition.
78
 British 
parliamentarism also exhibits a nuanced appreciation of the difference between legal and 
political accountability insofar as it divides the administrative function of the executive from the 
political answerability of the Cabinet.
79
 Furthermore, the lynchpin of this system is parliamentary 
sovereignty,
80
 meaning that the will of Parliament is supreme with only a few exceptions.
81
 The 
prevailing view of British parliamentarism is that it is more unified, effective, and accountable 
than presidential systems characterized by separated powers.
82
 But there is evidence to the 
contrary. For instance, presidential systems with separated powers provide more points of public 
access to the policymaking process than parliamentary systems, which are themselves more 
insular and difficult to penetrate.
83
  
 
In the British context, the separation of powers does not exist horizontally among the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches. It instead exists between the Crown and Parliament. 
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This form of separation has at least two origins. First, the Act of Settlement of 1701, which 
sought to limit the reach of the Crown in parliamentary affairs.
84
 And, second, the abuses of the 
Long Parliament and the restoration of the monarchy and the House of Lords.
85
 The framers of 
the United States Constitution seized upon this separation in crafting presidential war powers.
86
 
Indeed, the American state was constructed precisely to repudiate the parliamentarism.
87
 The 
Constitution itself reveals this founding intention.
88
 
 
Tomkins has masterfully elaborated this distinction between Parliament and the Crown. 
Instead of falling to the temptation of struggling to fit the English polity into the Madisonian 
model of a tripartite division of powers, Tomkins has described the English separation of powers 
on its own terms.
89
 The British model, according to Tomkins, embodies a different theory of the 
separation of powers, one that does not conform neither to the conventional view of separated 
powers nor to other models of parliamentarism. In dividing powers between the Crown and 
Parliament as opposed to the traditional division among the legislature, executive and 
judiciary the English model does the following: (1) requires the Queen to assent to a bill that 
creates primary legislation because this represents the legal moment when the two sovereign 
authorities of England reach agreement a moment without which primary legislation would be 
impossible; (2) makes ministers responsible to Parliament because they represent the Crown and 
are vehicles through which Parliament holds the Crown constitutionally and politically 
accountable; and (3) creates a valuable tension between Parliament and the courts insofar as 
Parliament is authorized to overrule courts, which themselves derive their constitutional 
authority from the Crown.
90
  
 
These are the critical elements to the separation of powers theory under British 
parliamentarism. They demonstrate that the separation of powers exists between Parliament and 
the Crown and not among government branches, as is otherwise the case in the American 
presidential model. Under Tomkins’ conception of the British polity, this separation serves each 
of the three democratic values of separated powers. First, by setting the Crown and Parliament in 
opposition, it prevents one from achieving ascendancy over the populace and therefore guards 
against tyranny. Second, it prevents arbitrary government because it is consistent with the rule of 
law and its corresponding essential features of predictability and equality. Finally, it promotes 
government efficiency because Parliament may pass laws under the watchful yet generally 
unintrusive gaze of the Crown. 
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 Therefore, separation of powers theory, as it is generally understood, may not be 
dominant in British parliamentarism but it is nonetheless influential.
91
 As Munro explains, there 
are admittedly overlaps between the executive, legislative and judicial powers in British 
parliamentarism. But there also exist self-imposed or statutory restrictions on taking advantage 
of those intersections. Consider three examples: (1) Law Lords, judicial agents, are endowed 
with legislative powers but do not freely exercise them; (2) the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords, both of which are legislative agents, have penal powers but do not typically 
discharge this executive responsibility; and (3) although all Cabinet ministers must generally be 
members of either the House of Commons or the House of Lords, there is a statutorily-imposed 
ceiling on the number of ministers that may sit in the legislature.
92
 These and other examples of 
institutional restraint help move British parliamentarism closer toward achieving the values 
served by a conventional understanding of separated powers. 
 
Some have nevertheless questioned whether the presidential separation of powers has 
protected liberty more successfully than parliamentary systems
93
 insofar as British 
parliamentarism raises perhaps one of the greatest dangers of tyrannical rule. Where the 
legislature is governed by a majority party that is driven by a rigid policy program and whose 
leader the prime minister, who is the head of government is equally unyielding, that is the 
most precarious context for democratic freedom.
94
 As Issacharoff argues, the fusion of executive 
and legislative powers in parliamentary systems provides a much weaker defense against the 
abuse of political power than the separation of powers in presidential systems.
95
 This is 
explained, at least in part, by the dominance that the executive can exert on the legislature. 
Though the legislature must approve the executive’s program, the executive, if it holds a 
majority, effectively enjoys the freedom to pass whatever law it pleases. Members of Parliament 
from the governing party who threaten to derail the executive’s program risk expulsion from the 
caucus unless the fall in line behind the party line. 
 
However, the countervailing virtue of this concentration of power may be the public’s 
enhanced capacity to hold accountable the abusive branch of government.
96
 While the British 
parliamentary system fuses the executive and legislative personnel, it retains a separation of 
executive and legislative functions insofar as the executive must keep the confidence of the 
legislature, which must in turn sanction the executive’s plan for governing. This is an important 
feature of British parliamentarism because it prevents the arbitrary exercise of government 
powers. It achieves these objectives by clearly identifying the respective responsibilities of the 
executive and legislative branches in a way that is comprehensible to the citizenry. 
 
                                                 
91 V. Harris, The Constitutional Future of New Zealand, 2004 NZ L. REV. 269, 274. 
92 Colin Munro, The Separation of Powers, 1981 PUBLIC LAW 19. 
93 J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 
54 (2002). 
94 Minasse Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions: The Emperor’s and the 
“Republic’s” Cucullus Non Facit Monachum, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 22 (2005). 
95 Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1454 (2007). 
96 R, Kent Weaver, Pension Reform in Canada: Lessons for the United States, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 45, 48 (2004). 
PRESIDENTIAL VALUES IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES                                 RICHARD ALBERT
 15
 Perhaps the greatest virtue of British parliamentarism is its capacity to promote efficient 
government, namely by facilitating quick and decisive action.
97
 Unlike presidential systems, 
parliamentary systems are generally unsusceptible to deadlock situations.
98
 Parliamentary 
systems avoid gridlock because, in a majority context, the leading party will find no 
encumbrances standing in the way of implementing its governing agenda. It will either push 
through its legislation or fall on a vote of no confidence if the legislation is of sufficient 
significance to warrant triggering an election over its defeat.
99
 The contrast with presidential 
systems on this point could not be any sharper: parliamentary systems are more concerned about 
promoting government efficiency than presidential systems, which are themselves more 
concerned with curbing the risk of tyrannical government.
100
 Paradoxically, presidential systems 
have often, if not regularly, degenerated into tyranny, almost certainly because of the strong 
incentives that presidentialism presents to the head of government to act extraconstitutionally.
101
 
The picture is therefore not as clear as the conventional wisdom would have us believe because 
British parliamentarism does indeed achieve the values of separated powers, albeit in an 
unorthodox fashion. 
B. Juricentric Separation of Powers: Constrained Parliamentarism 
 
Constrained parliamentarism has been adopted in several western nations, including 
Canada, Germany and India. Bruce Ackerman coined the term constrained parliamentarism to 
refer to systems that are similar to British parliamentarism with the following noteworthy 
exceptions: (1) Parliament is not fully sovereign; (2) the lower chamber is preeminent in 
legislative affairs and is normally the source for selecting Cabinet members; (3) the upper 
chamber is not the constitutional equivalent of the lower chamber; and (4) legislative powers are 
constrained by a written constitution, an enshrined bill of rights, and an independent judiciary 
endowed with the power of constitutional review.
102
  
 
In those modern parliamentary systems, the separation of powers is discernible in ways 
that defy the traditional understanding of separated powers. First, it is reflected in the role of 
opposition parties to publicly challenge, confront and critique the ruling party and to present 
itself as a viable alternative to it.
103
 Second, the judiciary occupies a central role in monitoring 
the actions of the fused executive and legislative departments. This latter element is perhaps the 
most important feature of constrained parliamentarism. Modern parliamentary democracies 
possess a strong and independent judiciary
104
 whose mission is to serve as a counterweight to the 
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majoritarianism that typifies parliamentarism.
105
 Perhaps paradoxically, given their lineage to 
British parliamentary supremacy, constrained parliamentary systems embrace judicial review as 
a defensive shield against the rise of tyranny.
106
 
 
Canada is the paradigmatic example of a constrained parliamentary system. Since the 
advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982,
107
 Canada no longer adheres to the theory 
of parliamentary sovereignty.
108
 The lower chamber the House of Commons is the leading 
force in legislative affairs whereas the upper chamber the Senate is not as significant a player 
in the legislative process.
109
 Moreover, Canada’s new bill of rights authorizes courts to exercise 
the power of judicial review.
110
 In view of the central positioning of Parliament in Canadian 
public policy as well as the increasing influence of the judiciary, Canada straddles the boundary 
dividing British parliamentarism and American presidentialism. 
 
As it sits in this intermediate site along the spectrum of democratic systems, Canada 
nonetheless adheres to separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court of Canada has on 
several occasions not only invoked the separation of powers but relied on it in reaching its 
decisions. The Court has recognized that although the Constitution does not expressly adopt the 
separation of powers
111
 and although the Constitution does not insist on a strict application of the 
separation of powers,
112
 it is nevertheless accurate to state that “there is in Canada a separation of 
powers among the three branches of government the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary.”
113
 The Supreme Court has moreover recognized the separation of powers as one of 
the “essential features” of Canadian constitutionalism
114
 and a “defining feature” of the Canadian 
constitutional order,
115
 one ensuring that “each of the branches of the State is vouchsafed a 
measure of autonomy from the others.”
116
  
 
The Court regards the separation of powers as a necessary precondition for judicial 
independence.
117
 On the Court’s reading, the judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and 
must be shielded from interference by the other branches in the judicial process.
118
 Even so, the 
Court has held that the permissive theory of separated powers in Canada permits non-judicial 
bodies to discharge judicial functions, just as the judiciary may itself be vested with non-judicial 
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functions.
119
 This does not mean, however, that certain functions cannot be exclusively judicial 
or executive or legislative in nature and, as a result, non-delegable.
120
  
 
To its credit, the Canadian Supreme Court has been careful not to overlook the critical 
differences between how the separation of powers operates as a practical matter in parliamentary 
and presidential systems. For instance, the Court once denied the executive branch’s claim that 
the legislature had frustrated its purposes by passing a law that ran counter to the executive’s 
wishes. The executive had relied on the formal separation of executive and legislative powers to 
make its argument, but the Court found this argument disingenuous precisely because the 
executive and legislative branches of government are, in Canada, controlled by the same 
individuals.
121
 
 
With this helpful context, we are now in a position to assess whether constrained 
parliamentarism is receptive to the values of separated powers: (1) guarding against government 
tyranny; (2) preventing arbitrary government; and (3) promoting government efficiency. 
Constrained parliamentary systems achieve the second and third values for the same reason that 
the British parliamentary system succeeds in achieving them. But constrained parliamentary 
systems may also potentially achieve the first value: defending against tyranny, which is 
something that British parliamentarism does not always achieve. Constrained parliamentary 
systems are more likely to successfully reach this democratic objective because they subject 
executive and legislative action to strong judicial oversight. The judiciary is tasked with the 
responsibility to uphold the written constitution and the entrenched bill of rights a duty that 
authorizes the judiciary to invalidate actions of other government departments that run counter to 
the principles and rules enshrined in those constitutional documents.  
 
 But the possible consequence of constrained parliamentarism is judicial tyranny. An 
independent judiciary possesses determinative authority to resolve disputes on the allocation and 
distribution of powers. Whether powers are separated vertically, horizontally or diagonally, the 
judiciary wields an enormous amount of power as the arbiter of jurisdictional disagreements. 
This form of tyranny which Hirschl calls juristocracy
122
 poses serious difficulties for popular 
governance because it invites, and perhaps entitles, the judiciary to decide polycentric issues.  
 
Polycentricity is the quality of a complex policy problem that contains subsidiary 
problem centers, each of which is connected to the others, which in turn creates the need for a 
solution to the parent problem that simultaneously addresses the secondary ones.
123
 Solving these 
problems often requires political sensitivity and practical sensibilities that, according to Fuller, 
may be out of the reach of judicial personnel and their advisors.
124
 Such issues, adds Fuller, are 
better managed by legislatures, which permit interested parties to reach solutions that, at once, 
accommodate divergent objectives, aggregate interests, and are the result of political 
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dealmaking.
125
 Judicial tyranny calls to mind Tocqueville’s familiar observation that all political 
questions ultimately become judicial ones
126
 insofar as judicial tyranny pulls all issues, including 
polycentric ones, into the judicial vortex, even though it may not be advisable for courts to 
decide them. 
C. Executive Separation of Powers: Semi-Presidentialism 
 
Semi-presidentialism traces its origin to the Fifth French Republic.
127
 The model 
appeared in 1958.
128
 Today, semi-presidential systems are in vogue, having sprouted in 
Croatia,
129
 the Slovak Republic,
130
 Poland,
131
 Russia, Hungary and elsewhere since the end of the 
Cold War.
132
 By 1999, roughly 50 nations had adopted semi-presidential systems,
133
 consistent 
with scholarly recommendations that budding democracies adopt this constitutional structure.
134
 
It was even proposed in the Draft Constitution for Afghanistan in 2004.
135
  
 
The French semi-presidential system sets itself apart from presidential and parliamentary 
systems on the following bases: (1) citizens elect a president directly, as in presidential systems; 
(2) the president or the legislature appoints the head of government, usually a prime minister, 
who must retain the confidence of the Parliament, as in parliamentary systems; (3) the president 
may trigger elections by dissolving the legislature but only in collaboration with the prime 
minister; (4) the president cannot veto legislation but can suggest that the legislature take a 
second look at legislation; (5) the president can legislate by decree if assigned those powers; and 
among others (6) members of Cabinet do not sit simultaneously in the legislature.
136
 
 
 Russia, another example of a semi-presidential state, has made a few noteworthy 
adjustments to the French model. The principal differences concern presidential powers.
137
 For 
example, the Russian president may both initiate and veto legislation, unlike the French 
president. The Russian president may also fire the entire government, something that the French 
president cannot do. One final illustration of the difference between Russian and French semi-
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presidentialism concerns a parliamentary vote of no-confidence against the prime minister, 
which, in France results immediately in new legislative elections while in Russia it does not 
unless the president ratifies that vote or parliament casts a second vote of no-confidence after the 
president refuses to ratify the first one.
138
 Although the Russian Constitution endorses the theory 
of separation of powers, in practice the Russian president exercises both executive and legislative 
powers,
139
 which may make the officeholder much more powerful than presidents in presidential 
systems and prime ministers in both British and constrained parliamentary systems. 
 
Semi-presidential presidents are not purely ceremonial politicians. They have broad 
powers that permit the officeholder to intervene in almost any matter of governance.
140
 In 
France, for instance, the president also exercises administrative rulemaking authority.
141
 And in 
the six postwar Korean republics, public power was largely concentrated in the hands of the 
president although the separation of powers between the president and prime minister was 
dynamic and never static.
142
  
 
The dominance of the president in semi-presidential systems is unsurprising given that 
those systems reflect the presidentialization of parliamentary systems through plebiscitarian 
leadership.
143
 But semi-presidential systems embody a compromise of sorts inasmuch as the 
president possesses an extraordinary menu of constitutional powers but those powers are in turn 
circumscribed by the constitutional text.
144
 
 
Yet presidents are not invariably powerful across all forms of semi-presidentialism. 
While semi-presidential presidents are at the apex of their power when they control the majority 
party in Parliament (and can therefore operate as presidents in presidential systems), they are 
considerably weaker when they face an opposing majority party in Parliament (in which case 
semi-presidential presidents must cede a sizeable measure of both real and perceived authority 
and popular legitimacy to the prime minister).
145
 
 
Semi-presidentialism, according to one scholar, has at least three structural defects: (1) 
direct election of the president endows the officeholder with extraordinary powers that are not 
offset by the checks and balances typical of presidential systems; (2) the dual executive creates 
an unproductive and undesirable tension; and (3) Parliament is relegated to obscurity behind the 
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omnipotent president and the dominant prime minister.
146
 Perhaps the most distinctive feature of 
semi-presidentialism is its divided executive, which consists of, on the one hand, a president who 
can claim an electoral mandate from the people of the entire nation and, on the other, a prime 
minister who enjoys the support of a majority of the legislature.
147
 This risks generating a crisis 
of legitimacy between the head of state and the head of government, each of which has an 
independent constituency from which to claim legitimacy and legitimate authority to act, as was 
recently the case in France when the president was compelled to administer the affairs of the 
state with a prime minister from an opposing political party.
148
 
 
Another instructive illustration is the Polish semi-presidential experiment in its transition 
to democracy. The dual executive stoked conflict between the president and the prime minister, 
neither of whom controlled the majority party in Parliament.
149
 The ultimate consequence of the 
inability of these leaders to forge a coalition was public disappointment not only in their leaders 
but also in the political process because these tensions came at a time when the nation was 
laboring hopefully toward post-Cold War reconciliation.
150
  
 
Semi-presidentialism, which gives the president a fixed term, also exhibits a further 
deficiency insofar as it does not necessarily always reflect the pulse of the people.
151
 
Specifically, unlike parliamentary systems, in which an unpopular prime minister could not 
survive in office for long without either resigning or signaling through some significant action a 
willingness to respond to public concerns, semi-presidential systems allow the president to 
remain in power through the balance of the elected term, even if presidential approval ratings 
drop to their nadir. This is precisely what happened in Poland. Presidential approval barely 
registered 20 percent in 1993 yet the president continued to govern through 1995, confident in 
his belief that he and the citizenry shared a special connection that could not be captured in 
public opinion polling.
152
 
 
Semi-presidentialism can theoretically achieve two of the three values served by 
separated powers: (1) preventing the arbitrary exercise of government power; and (2) defending 
against tyranny. It fails to always achieve the third value promoting government 
efficiency precisely because it succeeds in achieving the other two. Recall that semi-
presidential systems are characterized by a split executive: a head of state (usually a president 
who is directly elected) and a head of government (normally a prime minister who is either 
appointed or indirectly elected). The division of executive power between these two power 
centers fosters a disruptive constitutional ambiguity in certain circumstances, particularly given 
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the constitutional strains it cultivates as to setting and charting the trajectory for the state, 
developing and implementing policy, presiding over Cabinet meetings and discharging other 
executive functions.  
 
This executive separation of powers which is an unmistakable source of potential 
friction
153
 tilts toward presidential authority because semi-presidential systems tend to confer 
not only foreign affairs and defense responsibilities on the president but also latent powers that 
the president may invoke to respond to prime ministerial or parliamentary moves.
154
 The result 
of expanding presidential powers in this way at the expense of prime ministerial ones is to 
introduce predictability and create the conditions for stability in semi-presidential systems.
155
 
Nonetheless, semi-presidential systems compromise government efficiency in the interest of 
preventing tyranny and the arbitrary exercise of official power. 
IV. THE PROMISE OF FUSED POWERS
The critical point to seize from the analysis above is that liberal democracies have crafted 
various mechanisms by which to hold their governmental agents accountable, whether that 
accountability is understood in terms of guarding against tyranny, preventing arbitrary rule, or 
promoting efficient government. Indeed, several new democracies have indeed chosen to adopt 
parliamentary, and not presidential, systems while at the same time importing from 
parliamentary systems powerful institutions like constitutional courts possessing broad powers of 
executive and legislative oversight not unlike those common to the presidentialist United States 
Supreme Court.
156
 Nevertheless, democratic states may govern effectively under either 
parliamentary or presidential systems.
157
 
 
In this concluding Part, I marshal the conclusion reached above that separated powers 
are not fundamental to democracy precisely because fused powers may achieve the same 
values in order to explore the usefulness of constitutional structures that do not conform to 
traditional models of separated powers. I do so in the context of reconciliatory constitutionalism, 
which I use to refer to constitutionalism for emerging, fractious or reconstructive democracies.  
A. The Value of Values 
 
I am persuaded by the argument that states should not be confined to choosing between 
parliamentary and presidential systems, and should instead adopt constitutional structures, 
unorthodox though they may be, that satisfy the broader, more general fundamental principles of 
democratic governance.
158
 This may entail transforming existing models of either 
parliamentarinism or presidentialism, or brainstorming and subsequently fashioning entirely new 
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constitutional arrangements to respond to the new and evolving social, economic and cultural 
trends and conditions that states and their people must confront. I am thinking here, for example, 
of African states that have frequently transplanted western models of constitutionalism but not 
without adjustments to indigenous tastes.
159
 
 
Yet the choice between parliamentary and presidential systems is only part of the 
question. Parliamentary systems are often underpinned by principles that are either inconsistent 
with or run counter to the principle of separated powers. Consider the English model in which its 
unwritten constitutional traditions would be inconsistent with the presidential practice of 
enshrining the scope of separate governmental powers in a foundational text, or in which its 
adherence to parliamentary sovereignty would authorize Parliament to repudiate by statute any 
practice that had previously been statutorily instituted in the service of separating powers.
160
 
 
The three principal democratic values served by the separation of powers are nevertheless 
achievable to varying degrees in each of the three forms of parliamentarism that exist in 
constitutional states. The very constitutional structures that, in one type of parliamentary system, 
facilitate the fulfillment of a given democratic value may in fact frustrate the possibilities for 
fulfilling different democratic values in that same parliamentary system. There is consequently a 
trade-off between and among democratic values, and it remains within the purview of the 
citizenry and constitutional drafters to weigh the balance of these competing yet paradoxically 
complementary values. Citizens and their governmental agents must also choose the lens through 
which they will approach the question of separating powers, specifically whether they will 
adhere to a formalist, Holmesian or functionalist understanding of the theory: the first stresses 
the text and intent of the constitutional designers, the second conceives of the issue as a political 
question, and the third concerns itself with constitutional functions and their structures.
161
 These 
are complex questions of legal and political statecraft that invite heated debate about the 
purposes of constitutionalism and the use of public power.  
 
 This is an important discussion to undertake. Not only because it goes to the very core of 
what it means to be a people who strike common cause in order to establish a nation and erect 
the institutions of the state, but moreover because constitutionalism holds promise, in my view, 
for giving meaning to citizenship. Constitutionalism can crystallize the psychic relation between 
the citizen and her state to which Kelsen alluded,
162
 or the collective moral bond that Under 
deemed vital to the foundation of a legal system,
163
 or the social solidarity, which, for Durkheim, 
ensured the cohesion of society.
164
 That is the promise of constitutionalism. It may also perhaps 
be the promise of separating powers.  
 
But separated powers are not the solution for the ills of all civil societies aspiring to 
democratic legitimacy. After all, although the theory of separated powers is indeed sustained by 
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the rule of law, the rule of law can exist without separating governmental powers.
165
 For as 
important as it may be to construct a coherent case for the normative appeal of separated powers, 
there are higher stakes standing in balance. To be sure, it is more important to pursue the 
democratic values served by the separation of powers and to craft innovative systems that can 
respond to social and political conditions while perhaps nonetheless defying the traditional 
purposes of separating powers. Against this backdrop, the American founding fathers remain 
correct to this very day in at least one critical respect. They recognized very early on in their 
design of the American constitution both that some intermixture of government functions was 
necessary for satisfying certain democratic aims, and that separated powers were not necessarily 
the magic ingredient for ensuring an enduring democratic stability.
166
 
B. Creative Constitutionalism 
 
The foremost insight of separation of powers theory is that assigning governmental 
functions to different organs of the state may help advance important democratic values, 
including defending against government tyranny, preventing arbitrary government and 
promoting government efficiency. As I have shown the previous two Parts of this paper, those 
values are not achievable exclusively in presidential systems. Indeed, the various models of 
parliamentary systems, none of which reflects the standard conception of separation of powers 
theory, are receptive in varying degrees to these values and may fulfill them in ways that diverge 
from yet still reflect the core values of presidential systems. This is an important discovery 
because it unlocks several possibilities for the future of separation theory. 
 
 One such possibility is the prospect of designing constitutional systems that depart from 
the conventional models of presidentialism or parliamentarism. Until now, we have considered 
two incarnations of democratic constitutional structure: (1) the inter-branch separation of powers 
in presidential systems; and (2) the inter-branch fusion of powers in parliamentary systems. We 
have also seen a third incarnation: the inter-branch separation of parties in presidential systems.  
 
But we have yet to consider a fourth form of constitutional structure: the intra-branch 
fusion of parties in either parliamentary or presidential systems. This model holds promise for 
emerging, fractious or reconstructive democracies that must reconcile disparate factions or bring 
together rival peoples along the way toward stability and peace. Its vision of constitutionalism is 
a fundamental part of the nation-building process for new democracies, as opposed to the state-
building process, which is unmistakably important as a practical matter but less so than nation-
building because state-building is oriented more closely toward designing and establishing the 
institutions of the state. The constitutional design component of nation-building in emerging, 
fractious or reconstructive democracies is part of the process that I call reconciliatory 
constitutionalism. 
 
This model of intra-branch fusion of powers in parliamentary systems currently prevails 
in Iraq. The intra-branch fusion of parties was first introduced in the Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period in 2004. The intra-branch fusion of parties is 
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embodied in the Presidency Council, which is a three-member group that consists of the 
president of Iraq and two deputies, and in whom the executive authority of the state of Iraq is 
vested in part.
167
 The National Assembly of Iraq is tasked with the duty to elect the president and 
the two deputies.
168
 The Presidency Council has momentous functions that include representing 
the sovereignty of Iraq and overseeing the affairs of state.
169
 Specifically, the Presidency Council 
has the power to veto legislation duly passed by the National Assembly.
170
 It is also the 
commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, albeit only for ceremonial purposes.
171
 It is also 
responsible for judicial nominations.
172
 Perhaps its two most important constitutionally delegated 
tasks are, first, the power to name the prime minister
173
 and, second, the corollary power to 
dismiss the prime minister and the Council of Ministers.
174
 In discharging its weighty 
responsibilities, the Presidency Council must make its decisions unanimously and its members 
cannot deputize others to act in their stead.
175
 The more recent Iraqi Constitution, which received 
popular assent in 2005, has retained the Presidency Council until the end of the next term.
176
 The 
virtue of the Presidency Council is that it joins various competing parties together in the 
executive branch. It is a form of forced collaboration.  
 
Iraq is home to three major ethnic groups: Kurdish, Shi’ite and Sunni communities. The 
inaugural Council had the following composition: Kurdish member Jalal Talabani as president, 
with Shi’ite member Adel Abdul Mahdi and Sunni member Ghazi al-Yawar as deputies.
177
 The 
second Presidency Council was installed after the ratification of the new Iraqi Constitution: 
Talabani, a Kurd, remained president, Abdul Mahdi was retained as a deputy and the Shi’ite 
representative, and Tariq Al-Hashimi came onboard as the second deputy and the Sunni 
representative.
178
 Rather than allowing one of the three ethnic groups to possess the full powers 
of the presidency, the innovation of the Presidency Council gives each of those three groups a 
representative on this Council. And given that the Presidency Council must make its decisions 
unanimously, it also gives each of those three groups a voice and a veto in setting the direction of 
the state.  
 
 When measured against the theory of separated powers, the Presidency Council satisfies 
at least two of the three democratic values served by separation of powers theory. Recall that the 
three values are defending against government tyranny, preventing arbitrary government, and 
promoting government efficiency. The internal structure of the Presidency Council obstructs the 
rise of tyranny and precludes the arbitrary exercise of government power. But it does so at the 
great cost of government efficiency because it invites deadlock at two points, if not more. First, 
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the National Assembly’s selection of Presidency Council members is an intensely partisan and 
inherently complex project. Consider that it took two months for the National Assembly to pick 
the members of the Presidency Council in 2005.
179
  Second, the Presidency Council, which is 
responsible for naming a prime minister, may potentially reach an impasse in making a selection, 
given that each of the three members represent different interests. This was the case in 2005, 
when it took 10 weeks to name the prime minister.
180
 But despite this potential for stalemate and 
for compromising government efficiency, the Presidency Council generates substantial 
countervailing advantages, particularly in the context of reconciliatory constitutionalism. 
 
 Iraq’s current executive constitutional structure will remain in place until 2010, when the 
Presidency Council will expire and be replaced by a single president and a vice president.
181
 The 
hope animating Iraq’s creation of the Presidency Council is that the institutionalized cooperation 
that the Presidency Council has ushered in among the governing leaders of the nation will filter 
throughout the entire government apparatus and, more perhaps more importantly, permeate the 
popular culture. When it is dissolved in 2010, the Presidency Council will have been active for a 
period of six years. It remains to be seen whether such a short period of time will be sufficient to 
do anything more than plant the seeds for reconciliation in order to ultimately achieve this 
laudable but elusive ambition. It also remains to be seen whether the Iraqi people can indeed 
forge a national identity and collective sense of community and belonging in the current climate. 
Nevertheless, as a matter of constitutional theory and culture, the important point is that the 
Presidency Council is an inventive mechanism by which to use constitutional structure to shape 
political and public culture.  
 
 The Presidency Council is an example of consociationalism. Consociationalism, a term 
coined by Lijphart,
182
 is a theory advocating power-sharing among competing ethnicities, groups 
or blocs in a society that is severely divided in order to work toward a peaceful resolution of 
political and social disagreements.
183
 One interesting formulation describes consociational 
systems as non-territorial forms of federalism.
184
 This model exists in Belgium, Switzerland, 
Austria, the Netherlands,
185
 and also Canada in a more modest manifestation.
186
 The Council 
reflects one of the focal tenets of consociationalism, which is to encourage, or rather to compel, 
the cooperation of elites.
187
 Another central element of this system is granting a veto to each 
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group.
188
 The result is a form of coalition government that survives only on mutual 
accommodation,
189
 also secures some measure of cultural autonomy for the disparate members 
of the coalition.
190
 Consociational systems usually work better in states where there is no clear 
majority group that can demand, and also command, a greater representation in executive power-
sharing arrangements and consequently dominate the political process.
191
 
 
 As suggested above in the discussion of the Presidency Council, consociational 
arrangements can degenerate into political paralysis, as in Bosnia, where the consociationalist 
constitution has created gridlock.
192
 Consociationalism presents a further concern: formally 
entrenching ethnic or racial political power may exacerbate the very friction that the system 
sought to alleviate.
193
 These and other limitations of consociationalism have attracted a wide 
range of criticism about the promise it may hold for emerging, fractious and reconstructive 
democracies.
194
 
 
 But perhaps successful consociational arrangements are possible only where the citizenry 
and their government agents first manifest a willingness to at least attempt reconciliation. For it 
is one thing to compel cooperation among groups that have no willingness to do so, yet it is quite 
another to facilitate cooperation where the parties are evidently prepared to make compromises 
in the interest of a lasting settlement. This returns us full circle to our earlier discussion about 
whether structure controls culture. Unable to conclude as a matter of theory which of the two is 
the independent variable and which is the dependent one, we agreed upon an intermediate 
construction: constitutional structure and political culture are acutely interconnected insofar as 
the former derives its legitimacy from the latter, and the latter may be inclined to bend toward 
the former in certain instances. 
 
 In this light, states that might consider variations on the Iraqi model of the Presidency 
Council in order to inch closer to peace and work toward prosperity include Haiti, where citizens 
yearn for nothing more than a stable nation in which to raise their children, lead their lives, and 
find fulfillment.
195
 This would of course require some constitutional change, which is nothing if 
not extraordinarily difficult in the current climate of political uncertainty and government 
instability. Even assuming that constitutional adjustments were possible in Haiti, other obstacles 
would intervene to dissuade them. For instance, there are compelling arguments for retaining the 
basic constitutional structure that Haitians conferred upon themselves in 1987 following their 
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triumph over dictatorship.
196
 These are two powerful claims that seem to suggest the 
impracticability of adopting a new model of constitutionalism in Haiti. Nonetheless, the promise 
of the intra-branch fusion of powers may well be worth the cost and effort of undertaking 
constitutional revision in Haiti, and it may moreover outweigh the symbolic value of those 
revered constitutional arrangements.  
 
 The possibilities for the intra-branch fusion of powers in the context of reconciliatory 
constitutionalism are both intriguing and problematic. They are intriguing because the intra-
branch fusion of powers, if adopted in inviting societal conditions, may help smooth the terrain 
on which public policy is conceived, drafted and ultimately implemented in an emerging or 
rebuilding state. It may furthermore prompt collaboration and cooperation among the various 
ethnic or other groups that constitute the citizenry if those citizens perceive a similar dynamic in 
the interactions of their respective leaders. On the other hand, the possibilities for the intra-
branch fusion of powers are problematic because they may quite simply be unworkable.  
 
The project of designing constitutions so as to fuse parties within a particular branch of 
government may reflect a certain naïvete about the pursuit and preservation of political power 
and moreover about the willingness of clashing parties with a long-standing history of conflict or 
disagreement to set aside the past and wholly invest themselves in an indeterminate future. These 
are admittedly devastating criticisms that may, perhaps with good reason, discourage such 
constitutional tinkering and experimentation. Nevertheless, I remain optimistic about the 
reconciliatory promise of fused powers, particularly if the intra-branch fusion of parties in 
emerging, fractious or reconstructive democracies is accompanied on a parallel track by 
something similar to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
197
 and also by 
constitutional design procedures that are attentive to the values of inclusion and popular 
participation, as was partly the case in the recent Kenyan constitutional drafting process.
198
 
V. CONCLUSION
Separated powers were and remain an inventive device to achieve important democratic 
values in presidential systems. These values include thwarting the rise of government tyranny, 
preventing the arbitrary exercise of government power, and promoting the efficient 
administration of the state. But these core values of democracy are likewise achievable, albeit in 
varying degrees, in parliamentary systems. Whether those parliamentary systems separate 
powers in an unconventional fashion as in British parliamentarism or in a juricentric fashion in 
typical of constrained parliamentary systems, or between two independent executives like semi-
presidential systems, those three democratic values may indeed be achievable, though perhaps 
not in all circumstances. This is a profound point because it suggests that the democratic and 
structural advantages of separated powers are not inherent exclusively in presidential systems but 
may also be attainable in parliamentary systems. It is even more important because it leads to 
new possibilities for constitutional design.  
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One such prospective model of constitutional design is the intra-branch fusion of parties, 
which is perhaps most useful in thinking about constitutional design for emerging, fractious or 
reconstructive democracies. This form of reconciliatory constitutionalism holds promise for 
inspiring or instilling a constitutional culture that respects the rule of law, for rejecting divisive 
political posturing and partisan maneuvering, and also for embracing stability in the service of 
the larger interests of the state and its people. Although I have cited the Presidency Council as 
the flagship illustration of the intra-branch fusion of parties, there are certainly other examples of 
this form of fusion in the global community of states. 
 
This paper is largely, though not exclusively, anchored in the theory of constitutionalism 
and is consequently not as analytically engaged in assessing the practice of constitutionalism. It 
therefore invites further research and study, much of it empirical, in order to test the theoretical 
claims I have advanced. For instance, I have argued that the values of separated powers are 
indeed achievable, at least in part, in parliamentary systems. In doing so, I have deployed several 
modern examples for each of the three parliamentary systems I have discussed. It would be 
useful to consider whether and how the values of separated powers are achievable in additional 
examples of each type of parliamentary system: (1) New Zealand, as a manifestation of British 
parliamentarism; (2) India, as an example of constrained parliamentarism; and (3) Taiwan, which 
adheres to the structure of semi-presidentialism. Constitutional theory, and indeed the citizens of 
the democratizing nations of the world, would benefit immensely from close scrutiny of these 
models and their prospects for fulfilling the promise of democracy. 
